傅立民：俄乌冲突加速百年未有之大变局这对中美关系意...

jay

新客户广告位
更多广告请点击
中文黄页

6 y- X% v& `. z8 v( `
8 T5 ?& Q% D2 Q; @. ]

昨天傅立民大使(Chas Freeman, 尼克松访华首席翻译)在一封邮件里跟我分享了他近期在哈佛学院中国论坛上的讲话,对于当前俄乌冲突对世界局势的影响，他谈了谈自己的想法。小王觉得傅立民的这段演说很深刻，又很无奈。世界正在经历“百年未有之大变局”，带给我们的思考远超俄乌本身。

演讲中英文全文：

美国人现在对俄罗斯的侵略如此上心，以至于我们应该但却几乎没有去思考乌克兰战争正在催化全球局势的划时代变化，也没有思考如何去应对这些变化。普京总统决定使用武力捍卫莫斯科的安全利益，以及之后美国、欧洲、日本和澳大利亚的反应，显然都标志着“百年未有之大变局”。我们正在见证后冷战时期的结束，二战后和布雷顿森林体系时代的过去，以及其他世界秩序的历史性转变。

俄罗斯对融入西方进行的长达三个世纪的努力最终失败了。制裁正在使俄罗斯与欧洲和北美脱钩，并使其别无选择只能依赖中国和印度。欧洲不再和平。德国和日本在重整武装。芬兰和瑞典申请加入北约，而土耳其却将其搁置一旁。随着“脱欧”，英国失去了在欧洲的影响力，从而在全球范围内削弱了自己。中东已不再是美国的势力范围。

国际法几乎失去了所有可信度。以美元为基础的国际货币体系的未来越来越受到质疑。美国享受了四分之三世纪的“过高特权”正处于危险之中。随着非洲、阿拉伯世界、拉丁美洲、西亚，东南亚，中国和印度一道拒绝在乌克兰的美俄代理人战争中选边站队，这表明比起民主和专制，世界在前帝国主义大国和被他们压制的国家之间更加分裂。能够充分代表不断变化的全球政治主体的组织机构和能弥合这一鸿沟的制衡力量都越来越少。

乌克兰的噩梦是在美国和中国用寻求单方面优势的“大国竞争”取代寻求互利共赢之后发生的。中美关系正处于正常化后的最低点。这种变化以及日益扩大的美俄代理人战争所引发的变化正在加速将世界划分为相互竞争的经济、技术和军事集团——一个由美国领导，另一个以中国为中心，也许还有其他。气候变化、生态恶化和核扩散等全球性问题，以及为促进全球繁荣而重塑贸易和投资规则的挑战都被忽视了。中美关系的基本原则“求同存异”到底发生了什么？

最终，中国和美国将重新发现恢复友好关系的好处。但是，在我已经七十九岁的现在，我不指望能活到看到这一天。这种分裂，就像中苏分裂一样，是愚蠢的，但政治家们需要时间来恢复理智并试图修复它。

这对中美关系，中国人和美国人的关系意味着什么？

中国的经济繁荣和美国的科技进步都在两国过去四十年的合作中受益匪浅。双方目前为这种合作设置的障碍现在不仅帮不上忙还只能带来破坏。中国与俄罗斯和南半球国家合作，但不再与美国交好。美国将错过中国对其科学、技术和资本的可靠贡献，就像中国错过通过与美国合作取得进步的机会一样。

在座的许多人都在追随前几代中国人的脚步在西方寻求知识。即使经过长时间的停滞间断，二十世纪二三十年代在这里学习的人依旧能够引领 1980 年代中美学术交流的复兴。难过的是，你们这一代的中国学生可能会发现自己在一段时间内同样与这个国家隔绝。就像一个世纪前的中国学生一样，你必须亲身去了解它的优点和缺点。无论你留在这里、返回中国，还是去别处，当事情平静下来时--它们最终也会那样，你将成为中美互利关系复兴的基础。

事实是，如果不与对方和平交流，中国和美国都无法成为任何一方有能力成为的样子。我们将为脱离交往付出代价，但它不会永远持续下去。 我们可能在很多事情上存在分歧，但随着时间的推移，我们将重新接受合作的必要性，以推进我们共同的利益。而有很多那样的利益等待我们去发现。

Changes not seen in a Century

Remarks to the Harvard College China Forum

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)

Visiting Scholar, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University

By video from Washington, DC 16 April 2022

Americans are now so worked up about Russian aggression that we are not thinking nearly as much as we should be about the epochal changes in the global situation that the war in Ukraine is catalyzing or how to cope with these. President Putin’s decision to use force to defend Moscow’s perceived security interests and the reactions of the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia to this clearly mark “changes not seen in a century” [百年未有之大变局][1]—to coin a phrase. We are witnessing the end of the post-Cold War period and the passing of the post-World War II and Bretton Woods eras as well as other historic shifts in the world order.

Russia’s three-century-long effort to attach itself to the West has definitively failed. Sanctions are decoupling it from Europe and North America and leaving it with no alternative to dependence on China and India. Europe is no longer at peace. Germany and Japan are rearming. Finland and Sweden are applying for membership in NATO as Turkey sets it aside. With “Brexit,” Britain has forfeited influence in Europe and thereby diminished itself globally. The Middle East has ceased to be an American sphere of influence.

International law has lost almost all credibility. The future of the dollar-based international monetary system is in increasing doubt. The “exorbitant privileges” the United States has enjoyed for three-fourths of a century are at risk. As Africa, the Arab world, Latin America, and West and Southeast Asia join China and India in refusing to take sides in the US-Russia proxy war in Ukraine, they show that the world is much more divided between former imperialist powers and those they humiliated than between democracies and autocracies. There are ever fewer institutions that are sufficiently representative of shifting global subdivisions and power balances to bridge this divide.

The nightmare in Ukraine follows the replacement by the U.S. and China of efforts to seek mutual benefit with “great power rivalry” that seeks one-sided advantages. Sino-American relations are at a post-normalization nadir. The changes this and the widening Russo-American proxy war have catalyzed are accelerating the partition of the world into rival economic, technological, and military blocs – one led by the United States, another centered on China, and perhaps still others. Planetwide problems like climate change, environmental degradation, and nuclear proliferation as well as challenges like reinventing rules for trade and investment that enable greater global prosperity are being neglected. Whatever happened to 求同存异[2] – the founding principle of Sino-American relations?

Eventually, China and the United States will rediscover the merits of rapprochement. But, at seventy-nine, I do not expect to live to see this. This Sino-American split, like the Sino-Soviet split, is folly, but it will take time for statesmen to come to their senses and try to repair it.

What does this mean for relations between China and the United States or between Chinese and Americans?

China’s economic prosperity and America’s scientific and technological advance have both benefitted enormously from collaboration between the two countries over the past four decades. The impediments that both are erecting to such intercourse cannot now help but take their toll. China is aligned with Russia and the countries of the global South but no longer with the United States. America will miss reliable Chinese contributions to its science, technology, and capital as much as China misses the opportunity to advance through cooperation with the United States.

Many of you in this audience are following in the footsteps of previous generations of Chinese who sought knowledge in the West. After a long hiatus, those who studied here in the 1920s and ‘30s were able to lead the renewal of Sino-American scholarly communication in the 1980s. Sadly, your generation of Chinese students may find yourselves similarly isolated from this country for a time. You have come to know its merits and failings firsthand as Chinese students a century ago also did. Whether you remain here, return to China, or go elsewhere, when things calm down – as they eventually will, you will be the foundation on which mutually beneficial ties between China and the United States are renewed.

The fact is that neither China nor America can become what either has the capacity to be without peaceful engagement with the other. We will pay a price for disengagement, but it will not last forever. We may differ on many things but in time we will reembrace the imperative of cooperation to advance those interests we share. There are many such interests for us to rediscover.

' ~- L% d( k% g, b2 L